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Abstract

Firm-risk and managerial risk-taking though distinct are used interchangeably in empirical
literature. Here, we identify these two distinctly by examining different proxies for them. We
use income stream uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk, and market risk and
capital intensity ratio represent managerial risk-taking. Once defined, our objective is to find
the antecedents of both these by using the most advanced structural equation modelling (SEM)
approach from created constructs of performance, psychological, corporate governance,
shareholding patterns, fundamental valuation and firm’s characteristics drivers. We formulate
seven hypotheses based on empirical literature representing these constructs. We use data of
269 Indian firms for 18 (1999-2017) years to run SEM and then analyse our results individually
and combinedly. SEM is used here to test the unidimensionality of the seven constructs
(consisting of 19 drivers) and to analyze these drivers (i.e. antecedents) influence on firm-risk
and managerial risk-taking i.e. firm’s risk-play. Results prove that present firm-performance,
corporate governance drivers, promoters’ shareholding and firm’s characteristics are driving
firm’s risk-play. However, fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing
income stream uncertainty, systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes.
Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings act only as a catalyst of firm-risk.
JEL classification: G30, G40
Keywords: Firm-risk drivers, Managerial risk-taking drivers, Corporate governance,
Shareholdings, Firm characteristics, Structural equation modelling

1

Corresponding Author, Finance and Accounting, Goa Institute of Management, Poriem, Sattari, Goa 403505.
Email: ranjan@gim.ac.in, dasguptaranjan75@gmail.com
2

Xavier University Bhubaneshwar
Email: dr.rashmi.iitr@gmail.com, rashmi@xsc.edu.in

DasGupta & Singh | Antecedents

of Firm’s Risk-play

Introduction
Understanding risk from managerial risk-taking (problematic and innovative searches) and
firm-risk (i.e. income stream uncertainty) contexts is an important strategic management and
finance issue during last three decades. Empirical literature examines the concept of risk-taking
from economic (see Karni and Safra, 1987; and Machina, 1989) [i.e. how much (variability of
income)]; decision theoretic (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; and Keeney and Raiffa, 1976)
[i.e. who takes and when (Figner et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2002)]; and psychological (see
Kogan and Wallach, 1964; Tversky et al., 1988; etc.) [i.e. the extent to which the decision is
emotionally charged (Figner et al., 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2001)]; etc. perspectives across
the world. However, most of the earlier studies have used firm-risk to proxy for managerial
risk-taking based on the assumption that such managerial actions cause variations in firm
performance. While determinants and consequences of firm-risk is recently examined in the
US and other developed markets worldwide (see e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Faccio et al., 2011;
John et al., 2008; Li et al., 2013; etc.), little attention has been paid to these issues in emerging
markets. Scholarly research in strategy, finance and other organisation disciplines is generally
focused on identifying factors that explain firm performance without serious consideration of
drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play) except
in relation to systematic risk.
Few past empirical studies document individual organisational and industrial drivers of firmrisk in relation to firm fundamentals (see Jensen et al., 1992; La Porta et al., 2000; Lu et al.,
2019; etc.); firm performance (see Fisher and Hall; 1969; Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and
Deb, 2020; etc.); and corporate governance (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brick and
Chidambaran, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2015; etc.), but, mostly in developed market contexts.
Therefore, empirical literature is mostly silent about the drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk
and managerial risk-taking in terms of problematic or innovative searches by firms and their
managers. Only a few studies like Xiadong et al. (2014) tries to investigate its determinants
from theoretical application viewpoint. We fill these research gaps in the existing literature by
investigating the influence of firm’s performance, psychological factors, ownership patterns,
corporate governance, institutional characteristics, and valuation factors as antecedents of firmrisk and managerial risk-taking in a single model using the most advanced structural equation
modelling (SEM) approach in an emerging market context i.e. India. Our results would also
find out whether the same drivers are influencing both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking
behaviour, and if so which are these antecedents.
Accordingly, our main motivation of this study is to find out which of the studied antecedents
among performance, psychological, corporate governance, shareholding patterns, fundamental
valuation, and firm’s characteristics drivers influence both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking
in the emerging market context of India. As a secondary motivation, we would validate whether
income stream uncertainty and accounting beta proxying firm-risk, and capital intensity ratio
and market risk representing managerial risk-taking provide identical findings in the context of
antecedents driving firm’s overall risk-play.
To fulfil our objectives, we begin by providing working definitions of risk, firm-risk and
managerial risk-taking to show their distinctiveness to be studied here. These definitions would
also allow us to outline how managers’ risk-taking influences firm-risk as is generally
perceived by external stakeholders including the shareholders. Thereby, it is extremely critical
to draw a distinction between how managers perceive risk (i.e. managerial risk-taking) and how
external stakeholders measure risk (i.e. firm-risk), as these two have most often been confused
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and used interchangeably. Finally, we presume that despite differences between managerial
risk-taking and firm-risk, the former has a significant influence on the latter.
Strategy and finance literature define risk in two different ways. For some authors (e.g.
Feigenbaum and Thomas, 1988), it represents the degree of uncertainty and is thereby
measured as variability in income. This definition corresponds to notion of ‘firm-risk’, i.e. say
managers do problematic searches, as generally being held by investors/shareholders who wish
to price future income streams. A critical influence on the pricing of a firm’s future income
(i.e. through profitability measures and stock prices) is the uncertainty of that income. Firms
which report returns varying disproportionately (i.e. volatile or downside firms) relative to its
own past returns or overall market’s returns are of higher risk. Therefore, here we take both
income stream uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk. This would cater not only
the firm’s-, but industry-heterogeneity -based performance volatility also (see Fiegenbaum,
1990; Lehner, 2000; Miller and Bromiley, 1991; etc.)
Therefore, in such an organisational context, ‘managerial risk-taking’ refers to choosing the
strategies or investment opportunities with higher income variability within the wider range of
possible alternatives (i.e. innovative searches) to maximise bottom line. However, Shapira
(1995), Miller and Leiblein (1996), etc. argue that firm managers view risk more in terms of
downside losses (i.e. problematic searches). So, they are more likely to focus on potential losses
from an investment alternative, i.e., actions that increase firm’s exposure to losses are thereby
risky. Therefore, according to us, ‘managerial risk-taking’ seeks to reduce firm-risk by limiting
downside exposure even if this sacrifices upside potential in the strategic or investment
decision making process. That is why many prior studies inaccurately use firm-risk to proxy
managerial risk-taking because they assume that managerial risk-taking would modify firm’s
performance (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). All these motivate us to examine both firm-risk and
managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play, as we put it here) distinctively with different set
of proxies here.
Generally, managers make strategic choices among available alternative investment
opportunities, e.g., capital investment in new projects, research and development expenditures,
etc., i.e., in nature of problematic and/or innovative searches, on behalf of the firm, having
different risk-return characteristics. Then, one combines the risk-return characteristics of the
selected investments to create a portfolio of risk and return that reflects firm’s overall risk-play
in the form of variability of income streams and market returns which investors/shareholders
look at. Therefore, in this study we also use capital intensity ratio and market risk to proxy
managerial risk-taking in the firm context.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, we frame two different risk measures, i.e.,
firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play) under one model to examine and
find out the most influential drivers of them in an emerging market context which has never
done before. Under each of these measures, we have also taken two dependent variables each
of distinct nature to make our study more robust. Study results prove that present firmperformance, corporate governance, promoter’s shareholding and firm’s characteristics are
driving both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking simultaneously. However, fundamental
valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income-variability, systematic operating
risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings act only
as a catalyst of firm-risk. Secondly, we use the most advanced SEM approach for the first time
in literature to find out common antecedents for Indian firms which influence both firm-risk
and managerial risk-taking simultaneously. The SEM is a second-generation multivariate
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method that is used to assess the reliability and validity of the model measures by the CFA
(confirmatory factor analysis), and thereby much more superior to other regression methods.
Therefore, here we eliminate the weaknesses of the limited earlier studies with methodological
concerns.
Literature review and hypotheses development:
Performance drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Classical finance theory and empirical literature pre-Bowman (1980) (such as Fisher and Hall,
1969; and Hurdle, 1974) point out a significant positive association between firm’s risk and
return. Fisher and Hall (1969) in their seminal paper first present an economic argument of
firm-performance’s impact on risk-taking - “this implies that earnings should be larger, on the
average, for firms with greater variation in their earnings than for firms with little earnings
variability” (p.82). However, Bowman (1980) for the first time prove a negative risk-return
association for poor performers. The direct impact of firm-performance on firm-risk and
managerial risk-taking is central to work of Bowman (1980; 1984) and Fiegenbaum and
Thomas (1985; 1988) and is also significant in Singh’s (1986) research. However, most of
these studies see the impact of performance on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking from a
troubled firm context and not on an overall top-down basis. In addition, income stream
uncertainty is mostly been studied either taking the return on assets (ROA) or return on equity
(ROE) measures. To fill these gaps in the existing literature, here we take actual firmperformance, actual market-return performance of firms and also the cash performance to
examine the impact of performance as a whole on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e.
firm’s risk-play) (see table 1).
Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Performance drivers influence firm’s risk-play.
Psychological drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Firm’s managers take decisions based on two different measures - performance level they
aspire to (aspirations) and performance level they expect (expectations). This implies that the
amount of risk managers would accept depend on the expected performance in relation to
aspiration. When expected performance is higher than aspiration, managers are contended
about firm’s performance, so they need no change. However, if manager has his expected
performance level fall below aspiration level, a major organizational change is initiated to fix
policies, procedures and techniques that would increase firm-performance (see behavioural
theory of Cyert and March, 1963; and March and Shapira, 1987). Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) prospect theory puts that level of a firm’s aspiration serves as a target or reference level,
firms that anticipate returns below that level would be risk-taking and those that anticipate
returns above it would be risk-avoiding.
This aspiration-expectancy gap for below performing firms would induce them to undertake
risky decisions (problematic searches) in capex front, which in turn would reduce firm
predictability and create income stream uncertainty and investors’ suspicions. Lant and
Montgomery (1987) also find that performance below aspirations resulted in riskier choices
and more innovative searches than performance that met or exceeds aspirations. Although all
earlier studies use only actual performance to predict risk, we follow the behavioural theory
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(Cyert and March, 1963) of the firm and use expected performance along with actual
performance here. It allows us to differentiate between direct effects of performance on firmrisk and managerial risk-taking and psychological impact of aspiration-expectation process on
these.
As both aspiration and expectation are manager and firm-centric reference or target points we
also incorporate an industry performance psychological driver (see table 1) in line with earlier
empirical studies (Fiegenbaum, 1990; Lehner, 2000; and Miller and Bromiley, 1991) which
adopt industry mean or median as the reference point. This is also used here as a
complementary measure of firm’s actual performance impact on firm-risk and managerial risktaking (i.e. firm’s risk-play). Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Psychological drivers (aspiration-expectancy gap in terms of firm’s actual performance,
market performance and industry-adjusted performance) influence firm’s risk-play.
Corporate governance drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Although there is no optimal board-size for heterogeneous firms in a country context, size of
the board affects firm’s policy choices, and thereby firm’s risk-play and firm-value (see Coles
et al., 2008; and Guest, 2009). The standard argument is that larger the board less effective it
is at monitoring management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993). However, we find
mixed empirical evidence (Aebi et al., 2012). Several studies observe that we need larger
boards in large organisations to reflect complexities of their business models, to increase pool
of expertise and resources available, and to increase the potential of establishing contacts with
diverse customers and depositors (Dalton et al., 1999). Extending this idea, Cheng (2008)
shows that US firms with larger boards are associated with lower performance volatility. Wang
(2012) further documents that board size has a negative impact on investment decisions (i.e.
managerial risk-taking), as well as subsequent firm-risk.
Board’s diversity is also associated with better firm performance, quality of earnings and/or
lower risk-taking propensity by managers. There are several theoretical motives (see Fama,
1983; and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) as to why greater independence of directors
may be beneficial to effectiveness of the board. One of the most influential arguments
emphasises the role of incentives that independent directors have to protect their reputation
(see Fama, 1980) in the market for independent directorships. This would encourage them to
restrict firms and its managers to take innovative searches and thereby lower firm-risk and
managerial risk-taking (i.e., firm’s risk-play) (Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013;
Pathan, 2009). Therefore, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Corporate governance drivers influence firm’s risk-play.
Shareholding pattern drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Although, large body of literature documents that agency conflicts resulting from a separation
between ownership and control do indeed affect firm-decisions (e.g., firm restructuring,
divestment and mergers), one issue that remains largely unexplored is the impact of
shareholders’ identity/pattern on firm’s risk-taking, as the latter being a fundamental driver of
firm-performance and growth (Bromiley, 1991; John et al., 2008). Here, we seek to identify
whether ownership pattern has a significant and sizable impact on earnings volatility as well
as its normal effect on firm-outcomes through strategic decisions, i.e., managerial risk-taking.
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Prior research only focuses on institutional drivers of firm’s risk-taking (John et al., 2008;
Acharya et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013) or on the link between risk-taking and shareholder
diversification/concentration (Faccio et al., 2011) for publicly traded firms. However, we adopt
an alternative perspective and examine the impact of promoters and foreign owners and nonpromoter foreign shareholdings on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking behaviour. We argue
that foreign owners who are holding largest block either in promoter capacity or as FIIs in
Indian firms are more likely to undertake capital budgeting decisions (so capital intensity ratio
would also be high) that would increase earnings volatility (i.e., riskier projects). Foreign
owners/investors seek to improve firm’s operating performance might also implement
innovative searches such as introducing new production technologies and/or tightening
controls on production, that would also raise uncertainty of firm’s income streams.
In addition, foreign ownership fosters improvements in firm-level corporate governance than
would local investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Better governance would also in turn
positively impact firm’s risk-taking (John et al., 2008). Foreign investors in privatized firms
also seek to enhance diversification through their international investments. This
diversification would then most likely foster firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s
risk-play) as evidenced in Faccio et al. (2011). Therefore, our fourth and fifth hypothesis is:
H4: Higher promoter shareholdings influence firm’s risk-play.
and
H5: Higher foreign shareholdings (promoter and/or non-promoter FIIs) influence firm’s
risk-play.
Fundamental valuation drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Firms typically have heterogeneous alternative investment opportunities. Hence, corporate
governance’s and shareholding identity/pattern’s impact on firm-risk and managerial risktaking would not be the same for all firms. In fact, we argue that negative effect of a large board
should be weaker for high-growth firms, but more severe for low-growth firms (see Nakano
and Nguyen, 2012). Similarly, positive effect of foreign shareholding pattern should be
comparatively less strong in a high-growth firm than a low-growth peer has. As a result, a highgrowth firm would exhibit a higher market value (so price-to-book value would also be higher)
together with a high-risk profile. This implication fits well with findings from Coles et al.
(2008) that larger boards can add value in some circumstances even though their impact is
considered typically negative (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009). In addition, a high-growth firm
enjoys higher market share and mostly satisfies investors by higher dividend pay-outs.
Field studies using survey data (e.g., Brav et al., 2004) provide compelling evidence that firmrisk can shape dividend policy. Venkatesh (1989) also argue that higher level of firm-risk
causes a reduction in firm’s willingness to discharge cash through dividend payments.
Therefore, in choosing dividend levels, managers strategize in a way to sustain future earnings
with a high degree of certainty. This suggests that dividend payments should be inversely
related to firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play). Myers and Majluf (1984)
also contend that managers might also have to choose between dividend payments and capital
expenditures (investments) which is also used here as a proxy of managerial risk-taking.
Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is:
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H6: Fundamental valuation drivers (high-growth, increasing market-size, low dividend-payouts and increasing P/BV) influence firm’s risk-play.
Firm-characteristics drivers and firm’s risk-play:
Empirical studies (see Fisher and Hall, 1969; Hurdle, 1974; Lant and Montgomery, 1987;
Lehner, 2000; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009; John et al., 2008; Acharya et al., 2011; Aebi et
al., 2012; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Li et al., 2013; etc.) show
that firm’s characteristics act as catalysts to main conclusions drawn. In this context, Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) argue that risky external environment can shape firms risk-taking based
on its heterogeneous characteristics. Here, we have incorporated impact of external
environment by industry performance variable under psychological drivers.
We have also incorporated age, size, leverage and liquidity to proxy the impact of individual
firm’s heterogeneous characteristics on its risk-play. Age is the basic firm-characteristics which
impacts firm-risk and managerial risk-taking through the indirect route of ‘market power’ or
market size (is taken as a fundamental valuation driver here) in terms of its size, liquidity and
leverage. If ‘market power’ is assumed to have an impact on firm’s risk-play, and as it is only
logical to assume older firms which has survived for some length of time and large firms which
has size to play with, do have higher ‘market power’, then older and large firms would exhibit
evidence of lower risk (see Venkatesh, 1989). Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and Ferreira
and Vilela’s (2004) free cash flow hypothesis prove this theoretically. However, this
contradicts with the liquidity perspective, i.e., large firms hold less cash due to their greater
access to capital markets (see Subramaniam et al., 2011) because of their strong information
symmetry and thereby vulnerable to risk (see Opler et al., 1999; and Subramaniam et al., 2011).
On the other hand, expectation is that small firms would hold relatively more cash to avoid
financial distress/failures. This implies a risk-seeking attitude for large firms and an opposite
approach by their small counterparts. Opler et al. (1999) also find that firms with strong growth
opportunities (also a fundamental valuation driver here) hold more cash. Hannan and Freeman
(1984) and Nelson and Winter (1982) also point out that with increasing firm’s age, CEOs feel
more comfortable about following established routines and limit innovative search behaviors
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Therefore, overall, we argue that old firms take lower risks than
their younger counterparts do. Large organizations also normally have difficulty undertaking
dramatic changes (Aldrich, 1979), as they are more likely to have established routines and
hierarchical structures (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, overall, we also argue that small
firms are more risk seeking than large organisations.
Firms also can use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash (i.e. liquidity) because leverage
can act as a proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt (John, 1993). This implies higher risktaking by firms and managers. Baskin (1987) argues that cost of funds used to invest in liquidity
increases as the ratio of debt financing increases, which would imply a reduction in cash
holdings with increased debt in capital structure. Thus, in both ways it shows risk-seeking
attitude of these firms. Therefore, Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) predict that
there is a negative relation between firm’s cash holdings and its leverage in line with the
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and the free cash flow hypothesis (Ferreira and Vilela,
2004). Venkatesh (1989) also puts that simple financial analysis can demonstrate a positive
relation between financial and operating leverage and firm-risk. Firms with more resources (i.e.
slack) tend to have more leeway to indulge in exploratory activities (Cyert and March, 1963),
allowing their CEOs more discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Therefore, we also
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argue that excess liquidity increases managerial risk-taking and firm-risk (i.e. firm’s risk-play).
Therefore, our seventh and final hypothesis is:
Firm-characteristics [age (young), size (small), liquidity (low and high both) and leverage
(high) say positively] influence firm’s risk-play.
Data, variables descriptions and methodology:
Data:
We start with CNX NIFTY 500 firm’s data collected from Centre for Monitoring Indian
Economy’s (CMIE) prowess database. Nevertheless, data are available for approximately 379
firms for all study years starting from 1999 up to 2017. However, we exclude financial services
companies (including banks and NBFCs) for this study because of their normal prohibition in
financial literature. Thereby, finally we investigate 269 firms comprising of 5,111 firm years
for all 23 variables. This is in line with the requirements of the SEM as sample size is
approximately 11 times as many cases as variables.
Variable descriptions:
Table 1 explains the variables (under different constructs) used in this study.
Table 1: Description of variables
This table explains the dependent and independent variables (under different constructs) undertaken in this
study. The firm-risk (FR) is proxied by income stream risk and accounting beta risk and managerial risk-taking
(MR) is represented by capital intensity ratio and market risk. These are all dependent variables of this study.
The 19 independent variables (drivers/antecedents) as constructed here are classified into 7 broad heads
(constructs) in accordance with their nature. The heads are shown in parentheses after each variable.
Variables
Description
Income stream
Ex-post standard deviation () of individual firm’s actual return on assets (ROA) for
risk
preceding 5 years in year t
(FR)
[(Firm’s actual ROA in year t – Mean ROA of the firm for all years)×(Actual ROA mean
Accounting beta
for all firms in year t – Actual ROA mean for all firms [representing CNX NIFTY 500
() risk
Index here] for all years)]× (Actual ROA mean for all firms in year t – Actual ROA mean
(FR)
for all firms [representing CNX NIFTY 500 Index here] for all years)2
Capital intensity [(Average total assets/Sales)*100] in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year
t-1 + total assets in year t)/2]
risk
(MR)
(Annualised monthly market return of a firm in year t-1 – Annualised monthly market
Market risk
return of the benchmark index [CNX NIFTY 500 Index here] in year t-1)
(MR)
Actual ROA [(PAT/Average total assets)*100] in year t
Operating
performance
(PD)
Annualised monthly market return {[((1 + R)^12) - 1] x 100} of a firm in year t
Market
performance
(PD)
[(OCF/Average total assets)*100] in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year tCash
1 + total assets in year t)/2]
performance
(PD)
ASPt = ([ROAt-1 – ASPt-1 (i.e. ROAt-2)] + ROAt-1)
Aspiration
(PSYD)
EXPt = ([PEt-1 – EXPt-1 (i.e. PEt-2)] + PEt-1)
Expectation
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(PSYD)
[Firm’s actual ROA in year t (ROAt) - Mean ROA for all firms in a similar industry in
Industry
year t-1 (IndROAt-1)]
performance
(PSYD)
Logn number of directors in the board in year t
Board size
(CGV)
% of independent directors to total number of directors in the board in year t
Board
independence
(CGD)
% of shareholdings by the promoter(s) in year t
Promoter(s)
holdings
(SHPD1)
% of shareholdings by the foreign promoter(s) in year t
Foreign
promoter(s)
holdings
(SHPD2)
% of shareholdings by the non-promoter FIIs in year t
Non-promoter
FIIs holdings
(SHPD2)
Logn net sales amount in year t
Market size
(FVD)
Growth
% change in investment in total assets in year t from year t-1 (i.e.TAt = [{(TAt -TAtopportunities
1)/TAt-1}*100])
(FVD)
[(Equity dividend/PAT)*100] in year t
Dividend payout
(FVD)
Market capitalisation in year t/Book value of assets in year t (scaled in average)
P/BV
(FVD)
Logn (Year t – Year of incorporation of the firm)
Age
(FCD)
Logn average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-1 + total
Size
assets in year t)/2]
(FCD)
Debt/Average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-1 + total
Leverage
assets in year t)/2]
(FCD)
Logn average [{opening balance + closing balance}/2] of cash balance and short-term
Liquidity
investments (i.e. cash and cash equivalents) in year t
(FCD)
Note 1: All market return calculations are undertaken on adjusted closing price basis.
Note 2: All absolute amount figures have been log normalised.
Note 3: PD – Performance drivers; PSYD – Psychological drivers; CGD – Corporate governance drivers;
SHPD1 & 2 – Shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD – Fundamental valuation drivers; FCD – Firm
characteristics drivers.
Note 3: PAT – Profit after tax; OCF – Operating cash flow; ASPt - Aspiration in year t; EXPt - Expectation in
year t; PE - Price-earnings ratio; FIIs – Foreign institutional investors; TA – Total assets; P/BV – Price-to-book
value.

The unpredictability in a firm’s income stream is a result of its risk and managerial risk-taking
behaviour (Bromiley, 1991). Therefore, we measure firm’s risk from the income stream
variability and market-adjusted return variability (i.e. through accounting β) viewpoints under
this study. We also incorporate managerial problematic and innovative searches (risk-taking)
by market risk and capital intensity risk proxies.
In the first case, firm-risk (henceforth ) is measured as ex-post standard deviation of individual
firm’s actual return on assets (i.e. ROA) for preceding 5 years on a rolling basis, i.e.,
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(ROA)t =

of Firm’s Risk-play

(ROAj – ROA)2



j=t-5

(1)
n-1

Where, t = 2004, 2005,……., 2017

We also introduce here accounting beta to proxy firm-risk to surrogate the degree of covariability of a firm’s earnings and earnings of the market (i.e. other firms) (see Elgers, 1980).
This is a non-market measure of systematic risk and economy-wide factors duly affects it, as
opposed to unsystematic component that relates to other firm-specific factors. We calculate
this in line with Bowman (1979) (see table 1). Therefore, by taking market-adjusted accounting
beta along with firm-specific income stream risk, we make our study more robust.
We also measure managerial risk-taking by incorporating a market risk variable which we
calculate as stock market-adjusted stock return by taking the difference between firm’s monthly
stock return and monthly return on the value-weighted market index (i.e. CNX NIFTY 500
Index) (see table 1). This surrogates the risk the managers are taking to improve their stock
performance (to make investors happy). Second measure used here to proxy managerial risktaking is capital intensity ratio (see table 1). It increases managerial risk-taking in two ways
(Shapiro and Titman, 1986). If capital inputs are less variable than labour inputs in short-run,
managers of a firm choosing to produce a given output with large amounts of capital and low
amounts of labour increases its fixed costs and lowers its variable costs. The firm consequently
would experience larger variations in profits/income if demand fluctuates. Additionally,
managers using large amounts of capital (innovative searches) run a high risk of capital
obsolescence - the possibility that technological change would make its capital investment
worth little or nothing. Here, we calculate capital intensity risk as ratio of total assets to sales
in line with Miller and Bromiley (1991).
We discuss the independent constructs (see table 1) in detail while formulating hypotheses in
the previous section.
Methodology
We have used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) because the different constructs used in
the study are latent constructs (e.g., performance drivers, psychological drivers, corporate
governance drivers, shareholding pattern, etc.). This technique has the capacity to combine
empirical observations with relations among unobserved constructs into a single integrated
system. We have the following research questions like - do the performance drivers have any
effect on firms’ risk play? How does the different psychological drivers affect the firms’ risk
play? Is there any effect of corporate governance drivers on firms’ risk play? etc. To answer
these questions, we need a unified model provided by SEM to investigate the relationships
among multiple dependent and independent variables.
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Another reason for SEM to be the preferred model here compared to methods of conventional
multiple regressions is that SEM's typically disjointed nature to generate separate and
individually distinct coefficients. The SEM technique permits checking and examining a
complete model by generating goodness-of-fit statistics and assessing the overall fit (Gefen et
al., 2011; Ho and Shieh, 2006).
Accordingly, we employ the SEM to test unidimensionality of the constructs and to analyze
the drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking. We use the SEM here
because of its several privileges over other approaches (see e.g. Gefen et al., 2011; and Byrne,
2010).
We analyze the scales after collection of data to test purification, reliability, unidimensionality
and validity of them. Purification is done using Corrected Item Total Correlation (CITC),
reliability is tested using Cronbach’s Alpha while validity and unidimensionality are tested
using PLS Path Modeling. Under purification, we delete variables showing scores lower than
0.5 with respect to constructs to which it belongs, unless there is a compelling reason to keep
them in the respective constructs. We verify the convergent validity or unidimensionality of
each construct, modelled in the reflective mode, by examining their AVE values. Generally,
constructs which have AVE greater than 0.50 and composite reliability greater than 0.70, are
considered to have a good convergent validity (Chin, 1998). We ascertain the discriminant
validity of constructs by comparing the AVE scores of the two constructs, with the square of
the correlation between the two constructs. If both AVE values are larger than the square of
the correlation, we consider constructs to show discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker,
1981).
We also check the multivariate normality of all the variables used here by Shapiro-Wilks (SW) test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test as well as by skewness and kurtosis. We also test
the linear relationship by Box M test value (i.e. 270.61) with a p-value is 0.056. We use
Mahalanobis D-square and find that our dataset is free from outlier. The value of D2/df comes
out to be 3.05 for all the items under different constructs. We test one-way causality through
Granger’s (1969) test pre-modelling and find the observed covariance to be true. Therefore,
our dataset fits for the SEM.3

3

We do not include all results here for the sake of brevity.
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Results:
Descriptive statistics results
Table 2: Descriptive statistics results
This table provides mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of 269 Indian firms studied here
(see table 1 for description of these variables).
Variables
Mean
SD
Maximum
Minimum
0.41
2.72
23.01
0.41
(ROA) (%)
Acct. β
-4.74
3.15
29.08
-4.74
Capital intensity ratio (%)
0.01
8.83
127.36
0.01
Market risk (%)
-6.33
2.49
13.05
-6.33
ROA (%)
-6.87
6.02
34.21
-6.87
Market return (%)
-2.7
3.15
31.12
-2.7
Cash return (%)
0.02
14.16
165.99
0.02
Aspiration (%)
-6.77
6.12
34.48
-6.77
Expectation (%)
-0.6
21.92
359.69
-0.6
Industry performance (%)
-19.61
5.15
18.60
-19.61
Board size (logn)
0.56
0.11
1.33
0.56
Board independence (%)
0.01
9.82
65.76
0.01
Promoters holdings (%)
16.86
15.89
96.65
16.86
Foreign promoters holdings (%)
0.01
23.39
85.83
0.01
Non-promoter FIIs holdings (%)
0.02
7.90
38.91
0.02
Net sales (logn)
0.01
0.66
6.48
0.01
% change in TA
-5.16
16.29
197.85
-5.16
Dividend pay-outs (%)
0.01
36.06
490.00
0.01
P-to-BV
-1.3
3.91
34.83
-1.3
Age (logn)
1.26
0.20
2.19
1.26
Average TA (logn)
3
0.66
6.46
3
Debt/TA (%)
0.01
17.43
87.01
0.01
Average cash & CE (logn)
-0.79
1.21
5.25
-0.79

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics results of the variables undertaken in this study. Results
show that cash performance, expectation (i.e. PE multiples), promoters and foreign promoters
holdings, growth opportunities (based on TA), dividend pay-outs and leverage of Indian firms
are highly volatile which implies riskiness of these firms in wider contexts. This substantiates
the investigation of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking from different constructs’ impact as
done here.
Correlations results
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Table 3: Correlations results
This table presents the correlations results among the studied variables. Here, ISR stands for income stream risk, ACC indicates accounting beta, MR implies market risk, CIR
stands for capital intensity ratio, ROA means return on assets, MRE implies market return, CP denotes cash performance, ASP stands for aspiration, EXP implies expectation,
INDP indicates industry performance, BS represents board size, BI stands for board independence, PSH means promoters shareholdings, FPSH implies foreign promoters
shareholdings, NPFIIs indicates non-promoter FIIs holdings, MS implies market size, GO stands for growth opportunities, DPR represents dividend pay-outs, P/BV implies
price-to-book value, AGE indicates age of the firm, SIZE implies size of the firm, LEV represents leverage of the firm, LIQ stands for liquidity of the firm.
ISR

ACC

ISR
ACC
MR
CIR
ROA
MRE
CP
ASP

.240***
.003
.127**
.205***
.003
.010
.191***

EXP

-.002

INDP

.120**

BS
BI

-.281***
-.029

PSH

.038

FPSH

.026

NPFIIs

-.076

MS
GO

.246***
***
.177

DPR

-.004

P/BV

.162***

AGE
SIZE

MR

CIR

ROA

MRE

CP

ASP

EXP

INDP

BS

BI

PSH

FPSH

NPFIIs

MS

GO

DPR

P/BV

AGE

SIZE

LEV

LIQ

1
1
-.100*
-.002
.071
-.100*
-.013
.063
.073
.109*
.195***
.163***
.099

1
-.137**
-.074
0.086***
-.009
-.064

1
-.074
-.015
.791***

1
-.009
-.064

-.100*
.098

.007

.008

-.085

-.028

.668***

-.085

-.064
.086

.027
.038

-.028
-.053

-.064
.086

.008

.034
.080

.043

.054
.080

-.137**
-.014

.085
-.114*
-.033

.241***

1
-.092

-.075
-.018
-.034

-.081

-.077

.105*
.168***

-.114*
-.033

.022

.137**

.043

.162***
***
.262
-.023
-.033

.013
.130**
.069

.095

-.062

LEV
LIQ

-.031

.063
-.124**
.133**

-.103*
.145**

.054
.027

-.138**

-.034
-.133**

-.077

-.105*
.258***

-.158***
-.082

-.018

.454***

-.133**
-.111*

-.075

-.098
.577***
.265***

-.105*
.124**
.133**
-.138**

1
.015
.007
.008
.008
.065
.008
.050
.032
.021
.055
.051
.078
.030
.019
.008
.060

1
.008

1

.659***

.078

1

-.024
-.060

.123**
.014

-.004

1
.167***
-.054
-.080

.028

-.138**
.177***

.117*
.164***

.019

.155**

.127**

.065

.278***
.114*
.055

.021
.118*
.048
.107*
.063
.470***
-.072
-.091
.566***
.267***

-.044
.022
-.085
.130**
-.009
.070

1
.389***
.365***
.212***

.538***

1
.226***

1

.497***
-.013

-.121**
-.067

1
.300***

1

.056

.206***
.017

-.127**
.104*
.070

.254***
.038

.460***
-.041
-.031
.515***
.264***

-.116*
.135**
.477***
-.057
.339***

.022
.111*
.006
.157***
.036
-.092

-.032
.262***

.283***

-.080

.129**

.051
-.010

.004

-.060

.122**

1
-.106*
.048

1

.032
-.100*
-.007

-.131**
.380***

.265***

.670***

.281***
-.039

-.032

.025

.045

-.064

.254***

.463***

.019

-.003

-.137**

*** Accepted at 1% level of significance; ** Accepted at 5% level of significance; * Accepted at 10% level of significance.
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1

.110*

.237***
.036

-.105*
.078

.100*
-.013

.030

1

-.092

.128**

1

.330***
.084

-.070

.120**

1

.078

.561***

.148**

1
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Table 3 indicates the co-relationships among the studied variables. It is evident that
performance, aspirations, industry performance, growth opportunities and price-to-b
significantly positively influence firm-risk. On the other hand, managerial risksignificant positive association with market returns, growth opportunities and lever
sample firms. Board’s size, board-independence, market size, age, size and leverag
has significant negative association with income stream uncertainty and/or accoun
whereas aspiration, promoters’ shareholdings, price-to-book value, age, size, liqui
firm has significant negative impact on market risk and capital intensity risk proxie
also prove interrelationships in between variables, which formulate different const
All these results further substantiate our investigation objectives under this study.
Reliability and validity of measures results
Table 4: Standardized loadings and composite reliability (confirmatory factor analysis [CFA])

This table provides results of standardised loadings, composite reliability and the average variance extracted
constructs and variables formulating these constructs.
Constructs and indicators
Standardized
t-value
Composite reliability
V
loadings
Performance drivers (PD)
0.82
Operating performance (ROA)
0.781
3.44
Market performance
0.713
4.13
Cash performance
0.881
4.66
Psychological drivers (PSYD)
0.76
Aspiration
0.776
5.77
Expectation
0.811
6.57
Industry performance
0.791
9.11
Corporate
governance
0.78
drivers (CGD)
Board size
0.703
9.08
Board independence
0.772
1.99
Shareholding pattern drivers
0.80
(1) (SHPD1)
Promoter holdings
0.720
9.01
Shareholding pattern drivers
0.72
(2) (SHPD2)
Foreign promoter holdings
0.710
12.34
Non-promoter FIIs holdings
0.709
23.11
Fundamental
valuation
0.89
drivers (FVD)
Market size
0.779
12.65
Growth opportunities
0.761
13.44
Dividend pay-out
0.703
18.11
P/BV
0.778
12.13
Firm characteristics drivers
0.78
(FCD)
Age
0.704
11.56
Size
0.761
10.32
Leverage
0.776
11.65
Liquidity
0.773
10.44
Firm-Risk (FR)
0.82
Income Stream Risk
0.771
7.88
Accounting Beta Risk
0.701
9.76
Managerial
Risk-taking
0.77
(MR)
Capital Intensity Risk
0.770
10.98
Market Risk
0.810
11.11
Notes:df= 2.03, p-value<0.005, RMSEA = 0.020, GFI = 0.812, CFI =0.831, NFI=0.821.
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Fig. 1: Hypothesized model

Firm return,
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We have used AMOS 20 for the SEM here. In the first stage of data analysis, our first objective
is to measure the convergent validity of nine different constructs taken here, and, how they are
distinct from each other (i.e. discriminant validity). Therefore, we conduct a confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) based on 23 variables to check fitness of measurement model having 9
constructs of the theoretical model given in Fig.1. Tables 4 and 5 are showing results of CFA.
For our measurement model, values of different indices with (2/df) value of 2.03 (p <0.005),
RMSEA<0.05; CFI=0.831, GFI= 0.812 and NFI=0.821. Thus, it represents a good model fit
and all are acceptable (i.e. hypotheses results).
We examine the convergent validity by looking at each item loadings and the AVE. From table
4, it is evident that factor loadings for each construct are highly significant (p< 0.05, t> 1.96)
(see Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) and their values are ranging from 0.6 to 0.8, which signifies
convergent validity of the constructs. Value of composite reliability exceeds minimum value
of 0.7 (Holmes-Smith, 2001) and the AVE surpasses threshold value of 0.5 (see Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988).
Table 5: Discriminant validity measurement
This table provides results of discriminant validity (DV) as we find average variance extracted (AVE) for each
pair of variables is greater than the squared correlation for the same pair, which implies that each construct is
distinct. It also incorporates mean and SD of the constructs. Here PD stands for performance drivers; PSYD
represents psychological drivers; CGD implies corporate governance drivers; SHPD1 & 2 stands for
shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD represents fundamental valuation drivers; and FCD stands for firm
characteristics drivers. Also, FR stands for firm-risk and MR represents managerial risk-taking.
Test for
PD
PSYD
CGD
SHPD1
SHPD2
FVD
FCD
FR
MR
DV
1
PD
0.489
1
PSYD
0.411
0.401
1
CGD
0.541
0.511
0.501
1
SHPD1
0.243
0.324
0.344
0.301
1
SHPD2
0.441
0.541
0.501
0.411
0.551
1
FVD
0.324
0.432
0.431
0.512
0.311
0.551
1
FCD
0.442
0.334
0.331
0.341
0.331
0.501
0.500
1
FR
0.446
0.405
0.412
0.422
0.451
0.445
0.405
0.431
1
MR
5.50
5.13
5.19
5.46
5.55
5.61
5.05
5.88
5.67
MEAN
1.09
0.93
1.12
1.15
1.08
1.16
1.12
1.13
0.97
SD

Table 5 shows the discriminant validity in which the squared correlation between the constructs
is less than the AVE for each pair of constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). This implies that
each construct is distinct. The inter-correlation among the nine constructs are also significant
(p<0.05).
Hypotheses testing results
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Table 6: Hypotheses testing results
This table summarizes the hypotheses testing results based on t-value and significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Here PD stands for performance drivers; PSYD represents psychological drivers; CGD implies corporate
governance drivers; SHPD1 & 2 stands for shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD represents fundamental
valuation drivers; and FCD stands for firm characteristics drivers. Also, FR stands for firm-risk and MR
represents managerial risk-taking.
Hypotheses
Critical value (t-value)
Decision (accept/reject)
H1: PD
FR
11.32**
Accept
PD
MR
9.11***
Accept
H2: PSYD
FR
2.11*
Accept
PSYD
MR
1.46
Reject
H3: CGD
FR
12.11**
Accept
CGD
MR
12.23**
Accept
H4: SHPD1
FR
21.56**
Accept
SHPD1
MR
5.60**
Accept
H5: SHPD2
FR
3.12***
Accept
SHPD2
MR
1.22
Reject
H6: FVD
FR
0.44
Reject
FVD
MR
0.96
Reject
H7: FCD
FR
12.54**
Accept
FCD
MR
2.11*
Accept
*** Accepted at 1% level of significance; ** Accepted at 5% level of significance; * Accepted at 10%
level of significance.

It is proposed in this study that performance drivers influence firm-risk and managerial risktaking (H1). According to the results, the critical values (t-values) are11.32 at p<0.05 and 9.11
at p<0.01, hence our findings are significant in nature. It implies that firm’s operating
performance, market performance and cash performance all are significantly influencing its
risk and managerial attitudes towards problematic and innovative searches. Results prove that
psychological drivers (H2) i.e. aspirations, expectations and industry performance are only
significantly impacting income stream risk and operating performance’s systematic risk (i.e.
accounting β) (t-value of 2.11 at p<0.10), but doesn’t influence managerial risk-taking in the
broader context. So, hypothesis 2 is only partially accepted. Board’s size and its independent
nature (H3) i.e. corporate governance drivers are also significantly influencing both firm-risk
and managerial risk-taking with critical values of 12.11 and 12.23 (at p<0.05). Table 6 results
also show that hypothesis 4 (H4) is accepted as t-values of 21.56 and 5.60 are significant at 5%
level. Therefore, promoters’ shareholdings volume influence managerial propensity to take
risks and thereby the variability of income and systematic risk in relation to industry peers.
However, it is found that foreign promoters and non-promoter FIIs holdings only influence
firm-risk and not managerial risk-taking. This is due to the fact that hypothesis 5 (H5) is only
partially accepted with critical values (t-values) of 3.12 (at p<0.10) and 1.22 (at p>0.10). Table
6 results do not show any impact of market size, growth opportunities, dividend pay-outs and
P/BV (i.e. fundamental valuation drivers) on firm’s risk-play. Hypothesis 6 (H6) is rejected
under both cases with t-values of 0.44 and 0.96 (at p>0.10). However, interestingly, firm’s
characteristics drivers (age, size, leverage and liquidity) have a significant impact on firm-risk
and managerial risk-taking. This is evident by the significant t-values of 12.54 (at p<0.05) and
2.11 (at p<0.10) which accept hypothesis 7 (H7).
Discussion
In this study, we find impact of performance (irrespective of operating, market and cash) on
income stream variability (i.e. SD of past performance) and systematic deviation in firm’s
operating performance (i.e. accounting beta) from the overall context for all Indian firms in a
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top-down basis. This adds value to the empirical literature (Bowman, 1980; 1984; Fiegenbaum
and Thomas, 1985; 1988; etc.) which only examine the issue in a troubled-firms context. Our
results significantly and from different angles (as we have also taken the stock market
performance and cash performance along with firm’s ROA [limitation in erstwhile literature])
prove our hypothesis that performance drivers critically influence firm’s risk. Additionally, our
results show that managerial propensity to searches (both problematic and innovative) in
relation to firm’s stock performance (market risk proxy) in comparison to overall markets to
attract investors and searches via improving capital intensity ratio both are impacted by firm’s
performance.
We could not prove our initial observation that aspiration-expectancy gap for all firms in terms
of their actual performance (ROA here), market performance and industry-adjusted
performance would induce managers to resort to innovative searches. However, these drivers
influence firm-risk by making operating performance volatile and increasing systematic
deviation from the industry-leaders i.e. sound Indian firms. We may also confer that, as ageold empirical literature (see Cyert and March, 1963; and March and Shapira, 1987 [behavioural
theory]; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 [prospect theory]) points out that managers of poor
firms (below target or reference returns level) would be more risk-seeking than their superior
counterparts, hold true in Indian context (in line with Lant and Montgomery, 1987). Although
we prove that all psychological drivers used here are relevant to influence firm-risk.
One of the most critical findings of our study is impact of corporate governance drivers (boardsize and -independence) on both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking at the same time in an
emerging market context [like Wang (2012) in a developed market context]. Empirical
literature occasionally document Board-size’s negative influence on managerial risk-taking
(see Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; 1991) and positive influence on performance volatility (see Cheng,
2008) across developed markets. However, our study results significantly and overwhelmingly
prove influence of board size on both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking in the same direction
in an emerging market context i.e. India. We also prove the impact of board-independence as
a CGD in influencing organisational risk and innovative searches by Indian managers (thereby
contradicting with Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; and Pathan, 2009).
Our results also show that promoters’ shareholdings directly influence firm’s risk-play. This is
because promoters-shareholders do initiate risks to cater performance and growth for firms
(Bromiley, 1991; John et al., 2008). However, results show that foreign promoters and nonpromoter foreign holdings (FIIs) only influence income stream variability and systematic risk
of operating performance, and not innovative searches by managers. Therefore, it is evident
that our results do not substantiate overall results of John et al. (2008) and Faccio et al. (2011).
Results here also prove that fundamental valuation drivers i.e. market size, growth
opportunities, dividend pay-outs and P/BV of Indian firms has no role to play in influencing
firm-risk and managerial risk-attitudes. So, unlike Myers and Majluf (1984), Yermack (1996),
and Guest (2009) we could not find any counter-party influence of value and growth drivers of
Indian firms on their risk-profiles and manager’s searches which itself is quite intriguing
looking at other study results here.
On the contrary, it is interesting to observe significant influence of firm’s characteristics drivers
on an overall basis (i.e. age, size, leverage and liquidity) on both firm-risk and managerial risktaking in line with Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), etc. This,
however, contradicts with the mixed results of most of the erstwhile empirical studies including
Myers (1984), Venkatesh (1989), Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Subramaniam
et al. (2011), etc. So, we can comment in line with our presumed hypothesis that young firms,
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small firms in need of growth, explore innovative searches; high and low-liquidity and highleverage firms explore both problematic and innovative searches; which in turn impacts income
stream variability and generates higher systematic risks in operating performance for Indian
firms within normal business environments.
Conclusion
Determinants and consequences of firm-risk are examined in the US and other developed
markets worldwide (see e.g., Bargeron et al.,2010; Faccio et al., 2011; John et al., 2008; Li et
al., 2013; etc.). However, empirical literature pays little attention to these issues in emerging
markets contexts. In most of these studies firm-risk and managerial risk-taking are inaccurately
used interchangeably although practically they should be distinguished. Also, scholarly
research in strategy, finance and other organisation disciplines have generally focused on
identifying factors that explain company performance without serious consideration of drivers
(i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking except in relation to systematic risk.
We fill all these literature gaps by examining firm-risk (proxied by income stream risk and
accounting beta) and managerial risk-taking (proxied by market risk and capital intensity ratio)
under one model by the most advanced SEM to find out the antecedents of these for Indian
firms i.e. in an emerging market context.
Our results prove that present firm-performance, corporate governance, promoter’s
shareholding and institutional characteristics are driving both firm-risk and managerial risktaking. These findings contribute to the existing scant firm-risk and managerial risk-taking
literature in regard to their antecedents in the emerging market contexts. We extend the
importance of firm performance (see Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and Deb, 2020; etc.);
corporate governance (see Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2015; etc.);
concentration of promoter’s shareholdings (Faccio et al., 2011; and Ferreira and Matos, 2008);
and firms’ characteristics (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; John, 1993; Venkatesh, 1989; etc.)
in driving firm’s overall risk-play i.e. both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking. However,
fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income-variability,
systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign
shareholdings act only as a catalyst of firm-risk. The distinctness of our dependent variables
and vastness of our independent constructs has made this study more robust.
Future studies can examine the model tested here in a cross-country context and under different
situations and market cycles. The external environmental impact like economic, political,
regulatory, etc. influence firm-risk and managerial risk-taking combinedly can also add value
to this study results.
Our results would be of immense help to firm-insiders (managers and promoters), analysts and
investment consultants, market regulators and other firm-stakeholders who take active interest
in Indian firms or emerging countries firms. This is as all these stakeholders take active interest
in firm-specific associated risks especially in the current era of promoters’ pledged securities,
financial distress and fall-outs by Indian companies, etc. Our results clearly document the
firm’s internals that they can assess and/or look into to take their distinctive decisions in
different contexts. Study results can also promulgate future researchers to examine the
proposed model in other emerging countries or in cross-country contexts.
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